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Abstract—One reason for not adopting cloud services is the
required trust in the cloud provider: As they control the
hypervisor, any data processed in the system is accessible to them.
Full memory encryption for Virtual Machines (VM) protects
against curious cloud providers as well as otherwise compromised
hypervisors. AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is the
most prevalent hardware-based full memory encryption for VMs.
Its newest extension, SEV-ES, also protects the entire VM state
during context switches, aiming to ensure that the host neither
learns anything about the data that is processed inside the VM,
nor is able to modify its execution state. Several previous works
have analyzed the security of SEV and have shown that, by
controlling I/O, it is possible to exfiltrate data or even gain
control over the VM’s execution. In this work, we introduce
two new methods that allow us to inject arbitrary code into
SEV-ES secured virtual machines. Due to the lack of proper
integrity protection, it is sufficient to reuse existing ciphertext to
build a high-speed encryption oracle. As a result, our attack no
longer depends on control over the I/O, which is needed by prior
attacks. As I/O manipulation is highly detectable, our attacks
are stealthier. In addition, we reverse-engineer the previously
unknown, improved Xor-Encrypt-Xor (XEX) based encryption
mode, that AMD is using on updated processors, and show, for
the first time, how it can be overcome by our new attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual Machines (VMs) are a very important part of today’s
cloud computing market. They significantly ease technical
aspects of hosting. On the customer side they allow for flexible
resource scaling, due to their low setup time. Furthermore,
multiple VMs can run on the same physical machine, because
the hypervisor – the software that manages the virtualization
– provides one sided isolation, by preventing the VM from
accessing other software running on the host. Thus, the hosting
provider can make better use of its hardware.
Apart from that, potential customers still cite data privacy
concerns toward cloud service providers as a main reason not
to adopt cloud solutions, especially in cases where the hosting
location within a given jurisdiction cannot be guaranteed. Per-
forming sensitive computations in VMs requires the customer
to fully trust the hypervisor, since the hypervisor has direct
access to all virtualized resources.
Security solutions like full disk encryption only partially
address this issue, since the data is still vulnerable when being
decrypted and stored in the RAM at run time.
Providing full isolation between the hypervisor and the VM
has been studied extensively by researchers as well as industry
[9, 21, 22, 23, 24, 34]. Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) [9, 20, 27] was the first widely available solution
for protecting data in RAM. However, it only can protect
a small chunk of RAM, not the VM as a whole [17]. In
2016, AMD introduced Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
and Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) [24] to protect
the entire system memory. SME provides drop-in, AES-based
RAM encryption. SEV extends this for VMs by using different
encryption keys per VM, in order to prohibit the hypervisor
from inspecting the VM’s main memory. This was a first
step towards full isolation. The Linux kernel support for SEV
was mainlined in early 2018 [8]. In February 2017, AMD
introduced SEV Encrypted State (SEV-ES) [23], which offers
additional protection against manipulating the state of a VM
during context switches. While SEV-ES does not need new
hardware, it requires extensive modifications to the Linux
kernel. According to AMD, the corresponding patches are
mostly finished, however support for SEV-ES has not been
mainlined, yet [25]. Intel is also working on a solution similar
to SME/SEV, called Total Memory Encryption (TME)/Multi-
Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) [21], but did not
yet publish corresponding processors. A detailed comparison
between Intel SGX and AMD’s memory encryption can be
found in [28].
This work focuses on AMD’s solutions for providing full
isolation between hypervisor and VM, as it is the most preva-
lent full memory encryption. All prior attacks have either been
mitigated by SEV-ES or used I/O to move known plaintext into
encrypted pages. We show that our attack vector is available
even without user-controlled I/O or access to unprotected I/O
operations. Instead, we only require minimal knowledge about
the system to compromise and completely take over the VM.
To achieve this, we bootstrap an encryption oracle from just
a few megabytes of known plaintext, allowing us to place
and execute arbitrary code in the VM. We identify the lack
of integrity protection as the main reason for this weakness,
and postulate that full security against our attacks can only
be achieved by implementing a proper integrity protection
scheme. As an independent contribution, we also show that
AMD’s updated XEX-based memory encryption mode is still
vulnerable to the previous attacks.
A. Our Contribution
• We exploit the missing integrity protection of SEV to place
arbitrary code in a SEV-ES secured VM, without relying
on any I/O operations.
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• For this we bootstrap an encryption oracle just by moving
existing ciphertext within the VM’s memory.
• We show the security impact of the emulated cpuid
instruction by abusing it to create a high-performance
encryption oracle.
• We reverse engineer the new XEX encryption mode, that is
used on updated processors, and infer the associated tweak
values. We show that this mode is just as vulnerable as
the previous XE-based encryption mode which has been
exploited by prior attacks.
• We discuss previously proposed and new countermeasures,
and evaluate their impact on our attacks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AMD Memory Encryption
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) To protect against an
attacker with physical access to a system, AMD introduced
SME in 2016 [24]. SME encrypts data before writing it to
RAM, which renders it useless for an attacker attempting to
access the data, e.g., via a cold boot attack or Direct Memory
Access (DMA) [10, 18, 36]. The encryption and decryption
are controlled by the Secure Processor (SP), an ARM-based
co-processor.
A special bit in the page table – the so-called C-bit – is
used to indicate whether a page should be encrypted [24].
However, changing the C-bit does not change the content of
the page, only whether it is interpreted as encrypted or not.
There is no coherency between mappings of the same memory
location with different C-bit values, or different encryption
keys. Thus, changing the encryption status requires flushing all
involved CPU caches. In case the Operating System (OS) does
not support SME, Transparent SME (TSME) can be used: In
TSME mode, all memory pages are encrypted independently
from the value of the C-Bit.
When the system boots, a random memory encryption key
is created and stored in the SP [24]. Subsequently, memory
writes are encrypted, and memory reads are decrypted. For
both the encryption and decryption, the SP uses AES in
conjunction with a physical address-based tweak.
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) The SEV technol-
ogy was introduced together with SME in 2016. The goal of
SEV is to protect a VM from a malicious or compromised
hypervisor. This is achieved by using the memory encryption
technology of SME with a different encryption key for each
VM and the hypervisor itself. All keys are stored in the SP
and are not accessible by any other party.
Due to the different encryption keys, a hypervisor attempt-
ing to access data of a VM would get a decrypted version
using the hypervisor’s key, rendering the generated plaintext
useless. However, the VMs can use the hypervisor’s key to
intentionally share information.
A known issue of SEV is the lack of encrypting the Virtual
Machine Control Block (VMCB), which is a data structure
describing the state of a VM. It includes information like
the VM’s configuration and register contents. It also provides
means for communication between the hypervisor and the
VM: For example, if the VM exits due to an interrupt, the
processor stores appropriate metadata (e.g., a memory address)
in this structure. The lack of encryption can be exploited to
manipulate the execution flow of the VM and leak sensitive
information like [19, 33] have shown.
SEV Encrypted State (SEV-ES) To address these issues,
AMD introduced SEV-ES [23] as an extension for SEV. SEV-
ES splits the VMCB into two areas: The control area and the
save area. The unencrypted control area contains information
that must always be available to the hypervisor in order to
manage the VM, e.g., flags for interrupt injection. The save
area contains all of the other information from the VMCB, and
is protected against access or manipulation from the hypervisor
by encrypting it when the VM exits. However, since certain
operations require the VM to share data from its save area with
the hypervisor (e.g., reading and writing certain registers when
emulating cpuid), AMD introduced the Guest Hypervisor
Communication Block (GHCB), which basically is a shared
page, allowing communication between guest and hypervisor.
They introduced a new exception, which gets triggered by
operations that require the VM to share information with the
hypervisor, allowing the guest to copy the required data from
the VMCB to the GHCB before the #VMEXIT. When the VM
is resumed, it can copy the data back to its VMCB.
Encryption mode Like SME, SEV and SEV-ES provide drop-
in memory encryption, but for VMs. The memory encryption
has no ciphertext expansion, which means that structure and
size of the memory remain unchanged with and without en-
cryption. Similar techniques like Intel SGX [14] store Message
Authentication Code (MAC) tags for each memory block,
which allows for strong integrity protection, but comes with
significant overhead. In contrast, AMD does not store any
integrity protecting metadata, which is very convenient for the
user in terms of transparency and space-efficiency.
AMD achieves an implicit block level integrity protection
through the encryption: Changing any bits in a ciphertext block
results in a garbled and for the attacker unpredictable plaintext
block. Also, the usage of an address-based tweak should make
it difficult to decrypt a valid ciphertext at another address and
get a meaningful plaintext. One thus has to assume that the
VM execution will eventually halt if it encounters random data
blocks (i.e. invalid opcodes or state variables) – there are no
means of reliably detecting whether the ciphertext has been
tampered with.
Since both SME and SEV use the same technique for
the encryption process, they suffer from the same problems
regarding integrity. These problems are even more severe in the
case of SEV, because an attacker with hypervisor permissions
can easily manipulate or copy the RAM content of a VM.
B. Memory Encryption using Tweakable Block Ciphers
One popular method for storage encryption are tweak-
able block ciphers, such as AES-XTS [1], which is, e.g.,
used in Apple’s FileVault, MS Bitlocker and Android’s file-
based encryption. Tweakable block ciphers provide encryption
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without data expansion as well as some protection against
plaintext manipulation. A tweak allows to securely change
the behavior of the block cipher, similar to instantiating it
with a new key, but with little overhead. If the tweak is,
e.g., a function of the block address, the encryptions for each
block appear independent, which prevents numerous attacks on
the ciphertext, such as frequency analysis, block moving and
several more. However, without proper integrity protection,
several attacks remain possible, i.e., randomizing the plaintext
(by altering the ciphertext), replaying old values and traffic
analysis by monitoring location-specific changes.
AES-XTS includes ciphertext stealing, which allows
expansion-free block encryption for arbitrary-length plaintexts
by using previous ciphertext for padding. Memory in RAM
and the uncore part of the CPU is always handled in blocks
of 64 bytes, which is a multiple of the 16 byte block size
of AES. Thus, ciphertext stealing is not needed, reducing the
XTS mode to the original Xor-Encrypt-Xor (XEX) mode by
Rogaway [32]. XEX and Xor-Encrypt (XE) are methods to
turn a block cipher such as AES into a tweakable blockcipher,
where a tweak-derived value is XORed with the plaintext
before encryption (and XORed again after encryption in the
case of XEX).
C. Nested Paging
On most common OSs, processes use Virtual Addresses
to access data [15]. Those VAs are translated into Physical
Addresses, which determine where the data is located in the
physical memory. The mappings between VAs and PAs are
stored in the page table.
On virtualized systems, two different page tables are used.
Within the VM, the VA used by the guest, the Guest Virtual
Address (GVA), is translated to the Guest Physical Address
(GPA). The GPA is the address which the VM considers to be
the PA. However, on the host system itself another page table is
introduced, to allow multiple VMs to run on the same physical
machine. This second page table is called the Second Level
Address Translation (SLAT), or Nested Page Table (NPT) [5].
The NPT translates the GPA into the Host Physical Address
(HPA), the actual address of the data in physical memory.
When SEV is active, the page table in the guest is encrypted
and thus not accessible by the hypervisor. However, the
hypervisor is still responsible for managing the NPT. This
allows the hypervisor to infer information about the VM’s
memory assignment by monitoring the entries in the NPT.
The NPT cannot be accessed by the VM. It is therefore not
possible for the VM to prevent the hypervisor from overwriting
permissions in the NPT. Multiple attacks make use of this
possibility to gather information about where the VM stores
critical data [12, 19, 26, 30, 31].
D. Instruction Interception
In a virtualized environment, there are two reasons which
cause a VM to trigger a #VMEXIT, which hands control back
to the hypervisor. One reason are interrupts and exception
handlers, which need hypervisor assistance, e.g., page faults
due to swapped pages.
The second reason is the interception of special instructions
[6]. Two prominent examples for this are the cpuid and the
rdtsc instruction. The cpuid instruction allows querying a
wide span of CPU information, including an accurate model
number, a list of supported features and the system’s topology.
Changing the returned registers allows the hypervisor fine
grained control over the hardware features it exposes to the
guest. The rdtsc instruction returns the current state of
the core-private timestamp counter. OSs and other programs
may use this counter for cycle-level time measurements. If a
VM is live-migrated from one host to another, the cpuid
and rdtsc values on both machines might be different.
Emulating these instructions allows the hypervisor to convey a
consistent picture of the system state. Whether an instruction
is intercepted or not can be configured in the VMCB.
E. Previous Attacks on SEV
Manipulating VMCB Hetzelt and Buhren [19] explore the
idea of manipulating the general purpose registers stored in
the VMCB to create an encryption/decryption oracle. In order
to move data from memory into a register or vice versa,
they manipulate the RIP register in the VMCB, to construct
corresponding gadgets. SEV-ES mitigates these attacks.
I/O-based attacks Du et al. [16] build an encryption oracle,
which is based on self-generated network traffic. They require
that an Nginx web server is running in the VM and exploit
its memory management behavior, allowing them to locate the
content of specifically crafted, self-generated HTTP packets in
the VM’s RAM.
Morbitzer et al. [31] leverage the hypervisor’s control over
the NPT in order to swap GPA mappings. In combination with
a network service running inside the VM, which returns some
resources on request, they build a decryption oracle. In the
first phase, they locate the GPA where the response of the
network service is stored by repeatedly sending requests and
monitoring the page fault side channel. In the second phase,
they manipulate the NPT so that the GPA of the returned
resource points to another memory location. Thus, the content
of this memory location is returned on the next request. In
their follow-up work [30], they show how to locate GPAs that
might contain secret data, like encryption keys.
Li et al. [26] exploit the fact that DMA operations issued by
the VM are currently performed via an unencrypted bounce
buffer. They demonstrate that this can be used in combination
with network I/O, to create an encryption/decryption oracle. If
the VM performs network I/O, the packets are copied to the
bounce buffer, before they are processed by the network card.
To create an encryption oracle, they manipulate incoming data
in the bounce buffer before the VM copies it into its private
memory. For the decryption oracle, they manipulate the data
that the VM wants to send before it gets copied from the VM’s
private memory into the bounce buffer. To detect the memory
locations and hit the correct timing, they use the page fault
side channel.
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Fingerprinting Applications Werner et al. [33] showed two
independent results. First, they use the unencrypted VMCB
to reconstruct code executed in the VM by singlestepping the
VM while observing the changes to the unencrypted register
values in the VMCB. Like [19] they also use the unencrypted
VMCB to encrypt/decrypt data. This is mitigated by SEV-ES.
In their second result, they show how to use a performance
counter subsystem called Instruction Based Sampling (IBS)
to detect which applications are running in the VM. They
leverage that IBS leaks the GVA of return statements, and
show, that the distance between return statements uniquely
identifies specific versions of applications. They claim that
the guest cannot detect whether IBS is activated. This result
holds under SEV-ES.
Security of AMD-SP In [13] Buhren et al. take another
attack vector. They examine the security of the AMD SP,
which forms the root of trust for SEV. The SP only executes
signed firmware images. However, they found a bug in the
signature check mechanism, allowing them to execute manip-
ulated firmware on the SP. While newer firmware versions fix
that bug, there is no rollback prevention mechanism. Thus an
attacker can just load a vulnerable firmware version. Using
a modified firmware, they are able to extract the private key,
used by the SP to authenticate itself as an AMD device.
Data Faults In [11], Buhren et al. explore the idea of per-
forming classical fault attacks on application data in memory.
They flip a bit in a ciphertext block, in order to create garbled
plaintext. They demonstrate how to use this to perform a fault
attack on RSA CRT. They implemented their attack for SME
and required that the attacker is able to run an unprivileged
application and can perform DMA memory access. However,
it should also be possible to migrate this attack to SEV.
III. REVERSE ENGINEERING THE ENCRYPTION MODE
In order to predict how the plaintext that corresponds to
a ciphertext block changes, when the ciphertext block gets
copied to a new memory location, we reverse engineer the
AES encryption mode, particularly the address-based tweak
function. Only with this knowledge we are able to inject
meaningful data into the VM via ciphertext moving.
As shown in [16], AMD uses a tweaked AES encryption
to avoid that a ciphertext block appears multiple times due
to an identical plaintext. If AMD would not have added any
randomization, it would have been trivial to move ciphertext
blocks, and easy to fingerprint applications by detecting certain
repeating patterns in memory, e.g., alignment bytes between
functions, or zeroed pages.
Since an encrypted block does not have any kind of tag or
temporal information, AMD uses a function of its physical ad-
dress to compute the associated tweak value. In the following,
we summarize our findings on that function and verify and
extend the results from [16].
A. XE Encryption Mode
According to [16], the processor contains a fixed array of
16-byte tweak constants ti for i ≥ 4. Given a physical address
TABLE I. The first three tweak constants on an Epyc 7251 processor. We
denote the first one as t4, since there are no dedicated constants for the least
significant bits 3 to 0. This also implies that each tweak constant has a length
of 16 bytes.
t4 82 25 38 38 82 25 38 38 82 25 38 38 82 25 38 38
t5 ec 09 07 9c ec 09 07 9c ec 09 07 9c ec 09 07 9c
t6 40 00 00 18 40 00 00 18 40 00 00 18 40 00 00 18
p, where bit(p, i) represents its i-th least significant bit for
i ≥ 0, the tweak value T (p) is defined as
T (p) :=
n−1⊕
i=4
bit(p, i) · ti,
This means, that for each physical address bit the respective
tweak constant is XORed, if that bit is 1.
A 16-byte plaintext block m ∈ {0, 1}n with physical
address p is then encrypted as
EncK(m, p) := AESK (m⊕ T (p)) .
Similarly, decryption of a ciphertext c uses the inverse trans-
formation
DecK(c, p) := AES
−1
K (c)⊕ T (p).
This construction is a variant of the XE mode of opera-
tion [32].
We can exploit the missing integrity protection, to compute
all tweak constants ti: We encrypt a block m with physical
address p, copy the ciphertext to other addresses qj and decrypt
it there. By doing this, the tweak values of the source address
p and the target addresses qj are XORed:
DecK (EncK (m, p) , qj)
= AES−1K (AESK (m⊕ T (p)))⊕ T (qj)
= m⊕ T (p)⊕ T (qj)
= m⊕ T (p⊕ qj).
This allows us to build a system of linear equations, whose
solution are the tweak constants:
p⊕ q1
p⊕ q2
...
p⊕ qn−4
 ·

tn−1
tn−2
...
t4
 =

m⊕ T (p⊕ q1)
m⊕ T (p⊕ q2)
...
m⊕ T (p⊕ qn−4)
 .
The first few constants are shown in Table I. Each constant
consists of a repeating pattern of 4 bytes, thus reducing its
entropy to at most 32 bits.
The tweak constants on our Epyc 7251 mostly equal those
from [16], who used a Ryzen 7 1700X. This suggests that
AMD hardcoded these values, or at least uses a fixed seed
to generate them on startup. However, even fully randomizing
these values on boot would not add any security, since they
are shared across VMs and the hypervisor thus could easily
compute them in advance, as shown above.
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We also performed these experiments on an AMD Ryzen
1950X, which only has SME support. On our first measure-
ments we found that t8 = t9 = 0, which led to repeating pat-
terns within an encrypted page, if the plaintext was all zeroes;
some time later, after applying several operating system and
BIOS updates, the tweak values t8 and t9 changed, removing
those patterns. This leads us to the conclusion that the tweak
values are influenced by firmware.
In summary, these results show, that XE schemes in com-
bination with missing integrity protection leak information
about the tweak function. This is problematic especially in
the context of RAM encryption, where the tweak function is
required to have low computational complexity.
B. Updated XEX Encryption Mode
We conducted the same experiments on an Epyc Embedded
3151 processor, which was released about 8 months after the
Epyc 7251, and on an Epyc 7401P processor, which was
released together with the Epyc 7251. On both processors,
the system of linear equations did not have any solutions, i.e.,
AMD must have changed the encryption mode.
To reverse engineer the new encryption mode, we assumed
that AMD did not greatly deviate from their previous im-
plementations, and thus conducted a few experiments with
slightly modified functions which used the same tweak values
as before. This approach proved successful and yielded the
new encryption function
EncK(m, p) := AESK (m⊕ T (p))⊕ T (p),
and the matching decryption function
DecK(c, p) := AES
−1
K (c⊕ T (p))⊕ T (p).
As these equations show, AMD chose to use the XEX [32]
mode of operation, where a second tweak value is XORed to
the AES encrypted ciphertext; in this case, both tweak values
are identical.
The altered encryption function significantly complicates
calculating the tweak constants, since simply decrypting a
ciphertext at a different position does not yield usable results
anymore:
DecK (EncK (m, p) , q)
= AES−1K (AESK (m⊕ T (p))⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q))⊕ T (q).
Instead, the attacker needs to guess T (p)⊕ T (q) and add this
number to the ciphertext before decrypting. She can then check
her guess by computing
DecK (EncK (m, p)⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q), q)
?
= AES−1K (AESK (m⊕ T (p)))⊕ T (q)
= m⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q).
If all 128 bits of the tweak constants were chosen randomly,
this operation would become infeasible; however, AMD still
uses the repeated 4-byte pattern, so each tweak constant has
only 32 bits of entropy.
Guessing these tweak constants is still computationally
expensive, since one has to flush the respective TLB entry
and the CPU caches when changing the encryption status of
a page. We managed to partially work around this penalty by
parallelizing our guesses, taking only around 30 minutes for
each tweak constant. Given that even the newer CPUs still use
the same tweak constants for every VM, the hypervisor can
pre-compute the table once in advance, so the slightly higher
computation time becomes negligible in terms of security.
In summary, we showed that AMD implemented the well-
known XEX encryption mode. However, the tweak values have
very low entropy and depend linearly on the physical memory
addresses, enabling a malicious hypervisor to compute the
entire table of tweak constants nevertheless. In the next two
sections, we will exploit this fact and show how known
plaintext can be used to place arbitrary code and data in the
encrypted VM.
IV. CIPHER BLOCK MOVING ATTACK
As we have seen in the previous section, we can compute
the tweak values for any physical address. In this section we
show how a malicious hypervisor can use the knowledge of
the tweak values together with known plaintext and missing
integrity protection, to place 16-byte blocks containing some
consecutive, controlled bytes.
This narrow attack vector already suffices to insert early
returns in functions and skip parts of code, as shown in Section
V. In Section VI, these byte sequences are exploited to build
a full 16-byte encryption oracle, which allows us to execute
arbitrary code on the highest privilege level within the VM.
Contrary to previous work [16, 26], which has used network
I/O to create an encryption oracle, we do not need any control
over the plaintext that gets loaded into the VM in order to
inject arbitrary data/code: Instead we simply use the plaintext
that is already inside the VM anyway.
A. Attacker Model
We assume that the attacker controls the hypervisor, which
implies control over the NPTs and the ability to modify the
VM’s RAM. The attacker knows at least parts of the guest
kernel’s binary, which might be due to the unencrypted /boot
partition or by using fingerprinting (see Section VIII-D). We
assume that the VM is secured by SEV-ES, implicating that
the initial VM image cannot be tampered with and the VMCB
is protected. We do not require, that the VM communicates
over the network or uses disk I/O.
B. Tracking Guest Execution
To be able to make the VM execute hypervisor-supplied
code while being in a known state, we need to follow and
eventually suspend its execution. We achieve this by using
the page fault side channel, which has first been introduced
in the context of Intel SGX [35]. A schematic overview can
be found in Figure 1. Since we control the hypervisor, and
therefore the host page table, we can mark the relevant VM
pages as not writable or not executable. If the VM then tries to
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GPA rw- GPA rw-GPA r-x
Guest Page Table
HPA rwx HPA rwx HPA rw-
Host Page Table
GVA GVA GVACode:
rip
1. Remove execute
permission
        2. Page fault is raised due
to missing execute permission
Fig. 1. Page fault side channel. When the VM tries to execute an instruction,
the GVA which the program counter (rip) is pointing to has to be resolved
to a HPA. This is accomplished by performing a walk through the NPTs,
while checking the respective permission flags. The hypervisor can force the
VM to page fault by removing the execute flag in the host page table entry.
Subsequently, the hypervisor learns which page the VM tried to execute. The
same method can be used for detecting memory writes, by clearing the write
flag instead.
issue a memory write or execute an instruction, a page fault is
triggered and the corresponding hypervisor interrupt handler
is called. The page fault exception contains the GPA where
the fault occurred. The execution of the VM can be resumed
by marking the VM’s page as writable respectively executable
within the host page table.
Our attacks require computing tweak values, which in turn
depend on HPAs, so we have to infer the latter for both the
source and destination GPAs. The NPTs provide this transla-
tion. Since we aim at injecting and executing code in the VM,
we need to find GPAs that are mapped as executable inside
the guest. We cannot directly inspect the page tables inside the
VM, but we can acquire this information by monitoring for
page faults due to missing execute permissions via the page
fault side channel.
The guest kernel is a suitable target for code injection
attacks, because it is executed with the highest privileges and
is loaded to consecutive GPAs. On modern Linux kernels, the
base GPA, to which the kernel gets loaded, is randomized
by Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR).
We present two methods for finding the guest kernel when
KASLR is active. The Linux kernel is booted in two steps.
First a small bootstrapper is loaded (to a fixed GPA) that,
amongst other setup tasks, is responsible for loading the actual
kernel and for performing the KASLR. In the first approach,
we use our cipher block moving attack to modify the code
of the bootstrapper, such that the KASLR code is never
executed. That way, the kernel is always loaded to a fixed GPA.
We present a more detailed description in case study V-A.
For the second approach, we monitor the naturally occurring
page faults during VM startup. We exploit, that the kernel
is loaded to continuous GPAs and that the memory accesses
before loading the kernel to a randomized address, are quite
deterministic. This allows us to identify the memory accesses
related to loading the kernel, which gives us the GPAs of the
kernel.
At the moment, AMD’s patched Linux kernel cannot be
complied to run as a SEV-ES guest and use KASLR at the
same time, as the compile time options for these features ex-
clude each other (see CONFIG SEV ES GUEST and CON-
FIG RANDOMIZE BASE in arch/x86/Kconfig in AMD’s
kernel repository [2]). We are not aware of any fundamental
conflict between these two features and thus suspect that this
is only a temporary implementation issue.
We tested these methods on SEV secured machines, but
as they do not rely on an unencrypted VMCB they should
also work with SEV-ES. As mentioned in the attacker model,
the kernel code can be assumed to be entirely known to the
attacker and thus serves as a reliable source for ciphertext
blocks with known plaintext, which can be copied to other
places in the kernel to trigger malicious behavior.
C. Placing partially controlled Plaintext
Knowing the destination address in VM memory we can
now start to construct our attack primitive. Since SEV lacks
any integrity protection, the hypervisor can modify the con-
tents of the entire guest’s memory. Randomly guessing ci-
phertexts is rather unlikely to yield meaningful plaintext and
will, especially in the case of code, most probably crash the
VM. However, since we can compute the tweak values for any
given address, we can re-use existing ciphertext blocks after
applying slight adjustments.
We assume that we want to place a 16-byte block m at
address p. We then need to find an address q holding a known
16-byte plaintext block m′, which satisfies the following
property:
m⊕ T (p) = m′ ⊕ T (q)
⇔ m′ = m⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q)
Copying the corresponding ciphertext block from q to p and
decrypting it, yields the desired plaintext block m:
DecK (EncK (m⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q), q) , p)
= AES−1K (AESK (m⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q)⊕ T (q)))⊕ T (p)
= (m⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q)⊕ T (q))⊕ T (p)
= m.
To target the XEX encryption mode the copied ciphertext
block needs to be slightly adjusted, by adding T (p)⊕ T (q):
EncK (m⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q)) , q)⊕ T (p)⊕ T (q)
= AESK (m⊕ T (p))⊕ T (p).
Decrypting this at address p will then yield m.
The complexity of the bit sequences a malicious hypervisor
is able to create with this method is limited by several factors.
The first is the diversity of the known plaintext blocks, i.e.,
whether they have enough entropy. The next limitation is the
32-bit periodicity of the tweak values (which we can control by
choosing the HPA a GPA gets mapped to), so we can expect
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to be able to control at most 4 bytes of any 16-byte block
in a reliable way. Finally, for our processors we found that
only 28 tweak constants are linear independent, so for each
guest page the hypervisor can choose from up to 228 different
base addresses which yield different ciphertext blocks. This
suggests a rough upper bound of 3 bytes per block, which an
attacker is likely to be able to fully control, if given enough
plaintext and memory.
In our experiments, we found that we can very reliably find
a fitting pair m′/q for any sequence of two bytes, given about 8
MB of known plaintext. We copied the .text (code) section
of the Linux kernel bootstrapper as it gets loaded into memory,
which can be easily located due to the lack of randomization
of its load GPA. In addition, we can use the .text section of
the kernel binary itself, after locating it in memory with one
of the previously described methods.
D. Code Injection
We now show how the two controlled bytes per block can
be used to modify existing VM code, allowing us to redirect
the control flow and to insert arbitrary 2-byte instructions.
Instructions on x86-64 have variable length and might share
prefixes, so we have to consider whether we change or break
an existing instruction when injecting our 16-byte block. Also
we have to ensure that the uncontrolled bytes of our block do
not get executed. The easiest way to achieve this is by finding
a 16-byte aligned instruction and overwriting it with a short
branch instruction, like ret or jmp (Figure 2). This simple
modification already suffices to completely disable KASLR
(see Section V-A).
Finding a 16-byte aligned instruction for an injection point
is rather easy for 64-bit code: For performance reasons,
most compilers align functions and frequently used chunks
of functions to an architecture-specific value, which usually
happens to be 8 bytes on x86-64, so we can expect around
every second function to be aligned to a 16-byte boundary.
To avoid executing the uncontrolled bytes of a block, we
always have to insert a jump instruction – which takes both
usable bytes of a block, so this method only allows us to skip
small parts of the underlying code.
To insert other instructions, we propose the layout shown in
Figure 3. First we inject a jmp at a 16-byte aligned instruction.
With this, we jump to offset 14 of the following block, where
we can place an arbitrary two byte instruction (payload). Then
we can use the first two bytes of the following block to again
jump to the next payload location. This way we maximize the
amount of consecutive bytes that we can control.
In Section V we successfully use this method to disable
KASLR and illustrate a fast cpuid-based 16-byte encryption
oracle. Finally, in Section VI, we build another 16-byte en-
cryption oracle which solely relies on ciphertext block moving
and the ability to provoke a context switch between hypervisor
and VM at a precise moment in time. We demonstrate how
the latter can be achieved by using emulated instructions or
page faults. In contrast to the cpuid-based 16-byte encryption
oracle, this final encryption oracle does not depend on the
capability of the hypervisor to modify the result of emulated
operations, so it is difficult to mitigate without introducing
proper integrity protection. Both encryption oracles allow us
to execute arbitrary code within the VM.
V. ATTACK CASE STUDIES
A. Control Flow Modification for KASLR
To be able to track VM execution, the hypervisor needs
to know the base GPA of the kernel, which is randomized
by KASLR. In order to perform a first demonstration of our
attack primitives, we disable KASLR using the one-block code
injection method from Section IV-D, effectively placing the
kernel at a well-known, constant GPA.
When loading the kernel, the bootstrapper code calls
the function void choose_random_location(...),
which is defined in /boot/x86/compressed/kaslr.c. The function
checks whether the user provided the nokaslr command line
option; if this is the case, it returns immediately. Else the
function computes random physical and virtual base addresses
for the kernel and writes them into the supplied pointer
arguments. So, to disable KASLR, it is sufficient to place a
ret at an early location in the function.
To find the right point in time to modify
choose_random_location, we utilize the page fault
side-channel as explained in Section IV-B. We remove the
write permissions to the physical page after the first part
of the targeted function is copied. This causes a page fault
to be triggered as soon as the boot loader is done copying
the first part of the function and tries to copy the next one.
When handling the page fault, the hypervisor places the block
containing the ret instruction, and then resumes execution.
In our experiments, the targeted function was always located
near the end of the bootstrapper’s .text section, which
means that we already have a few MB of known plaintext at
this point, depending on the kernel binary. In addition, the
ret instruction only requires a 1-byte opcode, which greatly
reduces the amount of known plaintext that is needed to
inject the instruction. As stated above, AMD’s patched Linux
kernel can currently not be configured to both use KASLR
and run as an SEV-ES guest. Thus we only tested this attack
on SEV secured VMs (without the ES extension).
B. Using CPUID as an Encryption Oracle
Our code injection primitive can be combined with the
hypervisor-emulated (intercepted) cpuid instruction to gain
control over certain general purpose registers and build a high
performance 16-byte encryption oracle.
As explained in II-A, the content of the VMCB gets
encrypted and integrity protected upon a #VMEXIT in case
SEV-ES is enabled. This prevents a malicious hypervisor from
manipulating its content; however, in order to emulate instruc-
tions like cpuid, the value of certain registers is still shared
via the GHCB. While the guest owner may disable instruction
emulation, they are an important virtualization feature that
allows for fine-grained control over exposed hardware features
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??13
13 48f3 48 85 c0 74 ff c2 48 89 15 b0 2e 10 00 ff 10 48 89 05 a7 2e 10 00 48 89 05... ...
test
rax, rax
je
+0x13
inc
rdx
mov
qword [...], rdx
call
[rax]
mov
qword [...], rax
f3 48 85 c0 eb ?? ?? 05 a7 2e 10 00 48 89 05... ...
test
rax, rax
jmp
+0x13
??
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Example for changing execution flow by replacing one 16-byte block of code. While the base program (a) branches conditionally depending on
the value of the rax register, the patched version (b) has this branch replaced by an unconditional one. The remainder of the inserted block consists of
uncontrolled bytes, which are not expected to form a sequence of meaningful instructions.
pay
load
jmp
+0x1c
pay
load
jmp
+0x1c
jmp
+0x1c
pay
load
control flow
2 Bytes 14 Bytes
uncontrolled
uncontrolleduncontrolled
uncontrolleduncontrolled
uncontrolled
Fig. 3. A sequence of consecutive 16-byte blocks blocks are chained together
to get small contiguous chunks of code, which are connected by unconditional
2-byte jmp instructions to avoid executing the uncontrolled bytes in between.
Thus two bytes of every second block can be used to execute arbitrary 1-
byte or 2-byte instructions (payload). The last payload may either redirect to
original code (e.g., by returning), or enter a loop.
as well as keeping the VM’s environment consistent in case
of live migration.
OS kernels frequently call the cpuid instruction during
startup to retrieve information about the system’s capabilities
and topology. Since the results of these calls often get directly
stored in memory for caching purposes (e.g., the vendor
string), this poses an easy target for injection attacks.
First we determine the HPA of the cpuid call and the
associated memory store; then we inject a block containing
an unconditional jump to the cpuid instruction after the
memory store in order to create a loop. On each cpuid call,
the hypervisor sets the return registers, resumes execution and
waits for the next cpuid call. When this call occurs, the data
from the last call has been stored, so the hypervisor can copy
the encrypted data to the desired location.
We implemented this exploit in the get_model_name
function (arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c) of the
Linux kernel, since it writes the cpuid result to a contiguous
block of 16 bytes, which can be directly used as an encryption
oracle. One could also use our basic injection attack to create
such a cpuid loop. The results can be stored on the program’s
stack memory, whose GPA can be determined by the stack
detect gadget which will be presented in the next section.
Since we only need one VM/hypervisor context switch per
16-byte block, this channel is very efficient: We encrypted
1’000’000 blocks (16 MB) within around 37.5 seconds, sug-
gesting a bandwidth of around 3.41 MBit/s or 426.67 KB/s.
VI. EXECUTING ARBITRARY CODE
The previous two examples have shown that even little
modifications of control flow can have a severe effect on the
system’s overall security. However, our ultimate goal is to
execute arbitrary code, without having to rely on the ability to
control register contents through an intercepted instruction, or
use of I/O. We will advance the 4-byte block chaining method
from IV-D, to inject a program into the VM, which writes
arbitrary data into a 16-byte block of memory. This block
encryption oracle enables us to execute arbitrary code with
kernel privileges inside the VM. We show that the oracle can
be easily used to construct a decryption oracle as well.
The basic idea is to inject a small code gadget into the VM,
that performs some computations in order to write 4 bytes of
plaintext into a 32-bit register. Next we push this register onto
the stack, to get an encrypted version of our plaintext; this
serves as an intermediate 4-byte encryption oracle, so we are
able to control 2 + 4 = 6 consecutive bytes. We then use this
increased payload size to repeat the same process with 64-bit
registers, finally giving us control over the full 16 bytes of a
block.
A. Triggering the Hypervisor
The proposed attack needs careful synchronization between
VM and hypervisor, such that the hypervisor can suspend
execution at a precise point in time and modify guest memory.
We propose two different mechanisms to achieve this. The first
mechanism utilizes the cpuid instruction, which is emulated
by the hypervisor and features a 2-byte opcode: Each time
cpuid is executed, the hypervisor is called to emulate it. So,
by interleaving the injected instructions with cpuid calls, we
can precisely redirect execution to the hypervisor.
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The cpuid calls clobber the eax, ebx, ecx and edx
general purpose registers, so they are not usable for the
constructed gadgets. Also, the eax register (which determines
the requested leaf ID) should be cleared beforehand to avoid
calling additional handling logic in the hypervisor – leaf 0 just
returns the vendor ID.
It is convenient to use the cpuid instruction because it has
a simple handler in the KVM hypervisor. Instead of cpuid,
we could also use other instructions that are intercepted by
the hypervisor and require at most a 2-byte opcode, like
rdtsc (for a complete list see [6]). As stated in II-D,
instruction interception is important, as it, for example, allows
fine grained control over exposed hardware features as well as
live migration. However, as stated in II-D, the guest owner can
choose to disable instruction interception for the VM, with the
downside of losing the mentioned functionality.
A more complex alternative to the cpuid-based execution
transfer is the usage of the page fault side channel, which
also allows a precise interruption of the VM. If we want
to interrupt the VM between two injected instructions, we
ensure that they reside on two different pages p1 and p2, and
remove the execute permission in the hypervisor’s NPT. This
way, the VM gets interrupted before the first instruction in p2
gets executed. We then remove the execute permission for p1,
such that the hypervisor gets triggered another time to remove
execute permissions for p2 once again.
In the following we will use <sync> to express that one
of the just described mechanisms must be used, to interrupt
the VM at a certain point in time.
B. Finding the Stack
In order to use the stack for our encryption oracle, we need
to get the HPA of the related stack pages. We solve this
problem by combining the synchronisation mechanism with
the page fault side channel.
We use the attack primitive from Section IV-D to construct
an instruction sequence <sync>; push rdi; <sync>.
<sync> triggers the hypervisor, which then removes write
access from all memory pages belonging to the VM, and
resumes execution. The following push rdi tries to write
to the non-writable stack memory page, and subsequently
raises a page fault in the hypervisor. The page fault exception
information yields the corresponding GPA and thus the HPA
of the stack. However, on SEV-ES the page offset is masked
out. To overcome this, we take a copy of the whole page,
while the hypervisor is handling the page fault and compare
it with the content of the page at the second <sync>. The
position of the ciphertext block that was changed by the push
rdi operation gives us the exact offset of the stack inside the
page.
If the write address of the push rdi is near the end of a
page, the hypervisor may issue an extra pop rdi instruction
to ensure that the next stack operation writes to the same page.
This also significantly eases restoring original execution after
inserting the encryption oracle code.
aa bb cc dd 00 00 00 00 aa bb cc dd 00 00 00 00
?
?
00 08
rsp+0x00
rsp+0x10
1) push rsi
2) push rsi
esi = 0xddccbbaa
Fig. 4. Layout of stack after pushing the 32-bit esi register. The stack pointer
is decreased when pushing a register, so, depending on the stack pointer’s
original alignment, we might have to push the register another time to set the
lower address part of a 16-byte block. Since this is a 64-bit operation, the
(zeroed) higher 32-bits of rsi are pushed as well. Due to the endianness of
x86 the lower significant bytes end up first, the higher bytes last. We thus
finally get a 16-byte block where we control the first 4 bytes.
C. 4-Byte Encryption Oracle
Originally, x86 only supported 16-bit and 32-bit operands.
When the CPU vendors implemented support for native 64-
bit operations, they did not add new opcodes for every
general purpose instruction (e.g., arithmetic and memory-
to-register/register-to-memory); instead, they introduced the
REX prefix, which, when put before an instruction’s opcode,
upgrades its operands to 64-bit mode. Since in 32-bit mode
most general purpose instructions are encoded using at least
2 bytes, this prefix extends them to 3 bytes – but our attack
primitive only supports 2 bytes of payload. However, when
adding 64-bit support, the 1-byte push reg instructions
were redefined to only support 64-bit registers, so we can use
the payload to perform stack writes. We thus can use 32-bit
instructions to control the lower half of some registers, and
then push those onto the stack. Hence we can control the lower
4 bytes of a 16-byte block, so the possible payload is doubled,
enabling us to use 64-bit instructions for the next step.
x86 is a little endian system, so when we push a register to
the stack, its bytes are stored in reversed order. This means, if
we set the least significant 32 bits of a register and push it to
the stack, those bits will be placed at lower addresses (Figure
4). If the stack pointer has been 16-byte aligned before our
first push, the controlled bytes will then reside in the middle of
the 16-byte block, where we cannot chain them with another
block. So we have to push the register a second time – now the
stack pointer is 16-byte aligned, and the payload resides at the
block beginning. Depending on the stack page offset and the
amount of blocks being created, one might have to add some
pop instructions to free up stack space before proceeding with
the next block.
As a last building block, we need a gadget to place an
arbitrary 32-bit value into a register. This gadget can be con-
structed via a simple combination of increments and left shifts:
First, the register is cleared by XORing it with itself (this also
automatically clears the upper 32-bit of the corresponding 64-
bit register). To add a 0 bit, the register is just shifted; to
add a 1 bit, the register is incremented and then shifted. This
will take at most 31 rounds until the most-significant bit has
been set. All the involved instructions have 2-byte opcodes.
The final block layout forming the 32-bit oracle is shown in
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jmp	+0x1c
xor	esi,	esi
jmp	+0x1c
<sync>
0x00 0x02 0x10 Case 1: Set next bit to 0
A
shl	esiB
Case 2: Set next bit to 1
inc	esiA
shl	esiB
Case 3: Write to stack and reset
2x	push	rsiA
jmp	nextB
2x	nop
jmp	+0x1c
A
jmp	+0x1c
B
jmp	-0x62
next:
Virtual Machine Hypervisor
0x0e
Fig. 5. Schematic of the 4-byte encryption oracle. Each row represents a 16-byte block (not to scale), control flow jumps are denoted by arrows. On each
use of the sync mechanism from Section VI-A (for example a cpuid call), the hypervisor replaces blocks A and B depending on the desired action: It may
either shift 0s and 1s into esi, or push the rsi register two times to the stack to get an encrypted 16-byte block. This process can be repeated arbitrarily
often.
Figure 5. To move the payload from the location where it gets
encrypted to another memory location, we need to consider
the XOR difference of the tweaks used at these two memory
locations and XOR it with our payload before using the 4-byte
oracle.
In summary, we are now able to control 4 bytes per 16-byte
block. In the next paragraph, we show that this is sufficient to
inject a program allowing us to control a whole 16 byte block.
D. 16-Byte Encryption Oracle
The 16-byte encryption oracle works very similar to the
4-byte encryption oracle. First, we ensure that the stack is 16-
byte aligned; if we used the described process for creating the
4-byte encryption oracle, we already have this information.
Then we use the same strategy as in the 4-byte encryption
oracle to load the two 64-bit chunks of our plaintext into 64-
bit registers and push them onto the stack. Since we made
sure that the stack was 16-byte aligned before the first push
operation, we now have an entire 16-byte aligned 16-byte
block in memory, which only needs to be copied to the desired
location.
The formerly introduced 4-byte oracle allows us to use
6-byte instruction gadgets, so after subtracting the neces-
sary jmp instructions we can use 4 bytes of payload. This
is sufficient for most 64-bit register-to-register arithmetic.
Though there might be more efficient methods for assigning
hypervisor-defined values to a 64-bit register, we reuse the
increment/shift method for sake of simplicity.
The implementation is very similar to the 4-byte oracle: All
instructions involving the target register (rsi) are extended to
64-bit using the REX opcode prefix. Additionally, instead of
pushing rsi twice, it is only pushed once and another iteration
is started to push another value. This way, we can fully control
all 128 bits of the plaintext block. Figure 6 shows an excerpt
of a gadget using a 3-byte opcode payload.
48 ff c6 eb 1a
inc
rsi
jmp
+0x1c
??
Fig. 6. Example for injection of a 3-byte opcode payload followed by an
unconditional jump, using a block created with the cipher block moving
primitive, and one block from the 4-byte encryption oracle. It is desirable
to fully use the 4 bytes from the encryption oracle, since finding a fitting
block for the cipher block moving primitive requires more complexity, when
the number of payload bytes increases.
In summary, we are able to encrypt arbitrary 16-byte values,
by injecting a program into the VM that performs some
computations in order to write data into encrypted memory
owned by the VM.
E. Code Execution allows stealthy Decryption
Throughout this section we have shown how to execute
arbitrary code via a self-bootstrapping, non I/O dependent
encryption oracle. This of course raises the question if it is
possible to create a decryption oracle, with a similarly low set
of requirements. We now show how a decryption oracle can
be constructed by extending an idea of Hetzelt and Buhren
[19].
As explained in Subsection II-A, the encryption status of
a page can be controlled via the C-bit, in each page table
entry. This allows the VM to share pages with the hypervisor.
Hetzelt and Buhren show that using an encryption as well as
an decryption oracle, the hypervisor can insert a shared page
into the page table of a process running inside the VM. The
hypervisor can then copy the content of an encrypted page
into the shared page. In their approach, they use a decryption
oracle in order to find a free entry in the page table of a victim
process running in the VM. We do not need a decryption oracle
for this approach: Allocating a shared page, as well as copying
some data to it, can be done via an injected program instead.
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Thus, we conclude that the existence of an encryption oracle
immediately implies a decryption oracle. Furthermore this
method is very stealthy compared to using loggable network
communication to extract data, like in [26, 31]. In addition
this allows for very high throughput, as the copy rate of the
injected program is only limited by the VM’s ability to write
to RAM.
VII. COMPARISON TO RELATED WORK
First, we present a performance analysis of our 16 byte
encryption oracle, before comparing it to encryption (and
decryption) oracles constructed in related work.
Throughput of our oracle We performed our experiments on
two different setups. Initially we used an AMD Epyc 3151
CPU with 16 GB of RAM. The host was running Ubuntu
19.04 with Linux kernel version 5.0.18 and the guest was
running Ubuntu 19.04 with kernel 5.0.0-27-generic with 1 GB
of RAM. The used QEMU version was 2.12.0. As the BIOS
on this machine does not yet support SEV-ES, we also used
a machine with an Epyc 7401P processor, that provided the
necessary BIOS support, to verify our results under SEV-ES.
As mentioned in the introduction, SEV-ES needs extensive
software support in the Linux kernel, the QEMU emulator
and the UEFI of the VM. We used the versions from AMD’s
official repositories [2, 3, 4]. We made use of the SEVered
framework [29] to inject page faults into the VM.
To evaluate the performance of our encryption oracle, we
set up a program that waits for a trigger before calling
the function in which we injected our gadgets. First, we
bootstrap the 16-byte encryption oracle via the stack detect
gadget and the 4-byte encryption oracle. Then we use it a
thousand times to encrypt 16 bytes of payload data. On our
unoptimized prototype the setup part takes 0.62 seconds and
the payload encryption needed 75.86 seconds. This translates
to a throughput of 211 Bytes per second for the 16 byte oracle.
Our prototype implementation focuses on ease of imple-
mentation and debugability, thus the performance can be
improved by writing more than one bit to the rsi register
before interrupting the computation via the sync mechanism.
A sequence of zeroes could be written by inserting an x-bit
left shift (4 byte opcode), instead of performing x rounds with
a single bit left shift. Furthermore we could simply increase
the number of instructions we execute each round, to decrease
the number of interrupts/context switches and write operations
which require expensive flushes.
Comparison We compare our results to encryption/decryption
oracles constructed in related work. If not stated otherwise all
attacks assume a malicious hypervisor. An overview can be
found in Table II.
Du et al. [16] were, to the best of our knowledge, the first to
discover the original encryption mode of SME as well as the
tweak values. Their experiments were performed on an AMD
Ryzen CPU without SEV support (AMD Epyc 7xx1 CPUs
were not readily available at that time). They constructed an
encryption oracle for a self-built simulation of SEV. Their
TABLE II. Comparison of different approaches for encryption oracles. 1Li
et al. [26] only specify the decryption rate, but it should be similar to the
encryption rate.
Du et
al. [16]
Li et
al. [26] cpuid
Cipher
Block
Moving
Needs service in
VM yes no no no
Relies on I/O yes yes no no
Needs instruction
emulation no no yes no
Encryption rate
(B/s) unknown 200
1 426670 211
attack requires knowledge of the tweak values, an Nginx server
running in the VM and is not mitigated by SEV-ES.
They found that Nginx stores parts of the data sent to it
in consecutive 16 byte blocks at fixed offsets inside a page.
Building on this, they send an HTTP packet whose payload is
designed in a way, that the parts going to these offsets contain
exactly the tweak values of said offsets. This way, the data
encrypts to a constant ciphertext, making it easily detectable
in a memory dump.
They use this to encrypt code and execute it in the VM. In
contrast to our encryption oracle they rely on self-generated
network traffic getting processed by an Nginx webserver
inside the VM as well as the discussed memory management
behavior of Nginx. It is unclear whether different services, or
even different versions of Nginx, show a similar exploitable
behavior. They do not give performance measures.
Li et al. [26] showed how to create an encryption/decryption
oracle by leveraging unprotected DMA operations, knowledge
of the tweak function and control over the NPTs. For the
demonstrated attack, they also require network traffic, whose
frequency linearly scales with the throughput of their oracles.
Their attack works with SEV-ES.
According to them, DMA is the most common method
used by VMs to perform I/O Operations. They exploit that
current IOMMU hardware (which is responsible for perform-
ing DMA) only supports one memory encryption key, while
SEV uses one key for the hypervisor as well as an additional
key per VM. Thus all DMA operations must be performed
on memory pages ps that are shared between the hypervisor
and the VM, i.e., encrypted with the hypervisor’s encryption
key. This means if the guest wants to write data via DMA, it
first needs to prepare the content in a private page pp before
copying the content into ps. Reading data via DMA works the
other way around.
The general idea for their decryption oracle is to manipulate
the content of pp, before its content is copied to ps. For their
decryption oracle they use DMA write operations. To decrypt
the memory at address q they copy it into pp, before it gets
copied to ps. In order to get the GPA of pp they use the page
fault side channel. They demonstrated their ideas based on
DMA operations related to OpenSSH network traffic.
For the decryption oracle they are limited to the packets
sent by the VM. Furthermore, they show that they can make
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their oracle harder to detect by only overwriting parts of pp
that contain known metadata spanning at least a whole 16
byte aligned block. This way, they can restore the overwritten
parts before sending the package over the network. Assuming
a packet rate of 10 packets per second they showed that their
decryption oracle has a throughput of about 200 B/s.
For the encryption oracle they can use self-generated pack-
ets, even if there is no service listening. The VM can however
observe the amount of dropped packages. They did not give
any data for the throughput of the encryption oracle. But
since the construction is similar to the decryption case, its
throughput should scale in a comparable manner with the
packet rate.
For the encryption oracle they do not state whether the idea
of replacing the payload with known metadata can be applied.
If this is not possible, the VM can observe the packages
that get destroyed by the encryption oracle. Our encryption
oracle is not affected by such problems, because we take over
the control flow that processes the data, instead of trying to
manipulate data used by the regular control flow.
Like we have shown above, our encryption oracle reaches a
slightly higher throughput with our prototype implementation,
although they based their measurements on a SSH packet rate
of 10 pps, which is quite high for user generated input (one
packet roughly equals one keystroke). Since we do not depend
on I/O, we can achieve our throughput independently of the
rate of network packages. While they claim that their approach
can be applied to any DMA I/O performed by the VM, it is
unclear which of them sport known metadata that spans at
least a 16-byte aligned memory block in order to make the
attack stealthy.
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES
Our code injection attacks, as well as the injected 16-byte
encryption oracle, build on the missing integrity protection, the
reverse engineered tweak values, known plaintext and the page
fault side channel. The high performance cpuid encryption
oracle from the case study V-B also requires that the cpuid
instruction is interceptable by the hypervisor. In the following
paragraphs we discuss how changes in these areas influence
our attack.
A. Integrity Protection
With cryptographic integrity protection, the encryption sys-
tem could detect blocks created with the cipher block moving
approach. This would prevent us from injecting code/data
into the VM, mitigating the attacks presented in this paper,
as well as all of the related work mentioned in Section VII
with the exception of the application fingerprinting presented
in [33] and the attacks on the AMD SP from [13]. In
January 2020, AMD released a whitepaper on a planned future
extension called SEV Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) [7].
Instead of adding strong, cryptographic integrity protection,
they propose an access right based system called Reverse Map
Table (RMP), that assigns each physical memory page either
to the hypervisor, a specific VM or to the SP. Only the owner
of a page is given write access. The RMP will be manageable
by the hypervisor via an instruction set extension. For SEV-
SNP secured VMs, the RMP also contains the supposed GPA
of the page inside the VM as well as a ”validated” flag, that
is always false for new RMP entries. The ”validated” flag can
only be manipulated by the VM that the page is assigned to.
This way, AMD intends to prevent remapping attacks like the
one in [31], as they would require the VM to validate multiple
pages for one GPA. While this mechanism is not able to detect
that a cipher text block was manipulated, the lack of write
access to a page would prevent us from performing our cipher
block moving attack. However, given the required architectural
changes, it is not foreseeable when SEV-SNP will be available.
B. Tweak Function
Without the knowledge of the tweak values we could
no longer predict the effect of a cipher block move. [26]
claims that ”Future versions of the tweak function will be
implemented as T (k, a) where a is the physical address
and k is a random input that changes after every systems
boot”. For the non XEX version of the encryption scheme,
considered by them, this would not make any difference,
since our method from Section III can be implemented in a
kernel module to recalculate the tweak values at run time,
with very little overhead. For the XEX version, discovered
by us, we demonstrated in Subsection III-B how to brute
force the tweak values at run time, as long as they stay 32
bit periodic (or similarly low periodicity). While the tweak
recovery process takes about 30 minutes per tweak, we want
to stress that the decision to reboot is under the control of the
malicious hypervisor. However, we are unaware of any method
to directly calculate the tweak values, like it was possible with
the previous version. We believe that using 128-bit randomized
tweak values are a mitigation to this attack vector.
C. Fixing the Page Fault Side Channel
In our opinion, completely removing the hypervisor’s ability
to observe the page faults of the VM is not realistic, since the
hypervisor needs this information for memory management
purposes. However, we believe that the amount of leaked
information can be reduced, by restricting the hypervisor’s
ability to manipulate bits in the NPTs. This way we could
no longer provoke page faults, but only observe page faults
that are “naturally” triggered by the VM. This would however
most likely need major architectural changes, like instruction
set extensions. On the other hand, it would make our attack
significantly harder or even infeasible, depending on the avail-
ability of intercepted instructions as well as the RAM size of
the VM.
For the stack detection gadget, we could still use the same
general strategy. But, since we are no longer able to provoke a
page fault, allowing us to at least get the Guest Frame Number
(GFN) of the stack, we would now have to dump all of the
VM’s RAM that has ever been written to.
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In order to implement a sync mechanism, that allows us
to interrupt the VM at precise points in time, we are now
dependent on the availability of intercepted instructions.
We thus conclude that mitigating the page fault side channel
likely requires introducing major architectural changes. How-
ever, even in this case the hypervisor’s control over physical
memory could still be exploited to track the VM’s memory
usage.
D. Availability of Known Plaintext
For our attack, we used the Linux kernel itself as a source
of known plaintext. As customers most likely use a common
Linux distribution, it can be assumed that they are running the
kernel supplied by the respective distribution. Furthermore,
normal disc encryption setups do not encrypt the /boot
partition from which the kernel gets loaded at boot, allowing
the attacker to read the kernel binary in plaintext.
If the entire boot image is encrypted, one can use the
technique presented in Werner et al. [33]: They showed how
to use IBS to reliably fingerprint specific application ver-
sions running in SEV-ES secured VMs based on the distance
(measured by the GVA) of executed return instructions of an
application. While they only evaluated their approach for user
space applications, their result is also applicable to the Linux
kernel. Another approach is building on a method presented
in [19]: They show that the kernel location can be detected at
runtime, by removing the execute permissions from all of the
VM’s memory pages, injecting an interrupt and observing the
occurring page faults. Given the result of Werner et al., this
could also be used to fingerprint the kernel based on the GPAs
of the interrupt handler functions.
E. Emulated Operations
Whether an instruction like cpuid or rdtsc is intercepted
by the hypervisor can be configured in the control area of
the VMCB [6]. The VMCB gets encrypted and integrity
protected upon a #VMEXIT. Furthermore, it is part of the
initial attestation [23], so it cannot be manipulated by a
malicious hypervisor. The high performance cpuid-based
encryption oracle from Section V-B can thus be mitigated by
disabling interception of the cpuid instruction [6]. However,
as already stated in Section II-D, emulation of instructions is
an important virtualization feature, since it allows fine grained
control over exposed hardware features as well as simulating
a consistent environment during live migration.
In theory, the GHCB mechanism used under SEV-ES al-
lows the VM to inspect the hypervisor supplied results of
an emulated operation before it continuous its operation.
However, AMD’s current SEV-ES kernel does not implement
such checks (cf. function vmg_cpuid). For operations like
rdtsc, the effectiveness of filtering is uncertain. In the
recently released AMD-SNP whitepaper [7] AMD describes
a mechanism, that allows the VM to verify the result of the
cpuid operation by using the SP as a proxy. This is possible,
as the hypervisor cannot interfere with the result of operations
executed on the SP.
F. Detection
Another important aspect, besides direct countermeasures,
is attack detection. In the scenario of a malicious hypervisor
spying on VMs, detecting an attack could lead the guests to
switch to another service or pursue legal matters.
Since SEV itself does not provide any integrity protection
for the RAM content, this must be done by the guest and in
software. This is significantly complicated by the large number
of possible injection points, and the fact that the injected
code is only temporarily present. In addition, the program that
inspects the guests RAM content in order to find changed code,
cannot be certain that its own code is unchanged.
Another approach is detecting abnormal behavior, like the
unusual kernel base address when disabling KASLR. However,
detecting more transient abnormal behavior, like a manipulated
random number generator, is quite difficult due to the large
attack surface.
IX. RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE
We have informed AMD of our findings. In our discussions
they suggested that the recently released Zen 2 architecture
uses an improved tweak generation, which is no longer 4-
byte periodic and uses fresh randomness per boot, which may
significantly complicate the described attacks. However, they
did not implement an additional integrity protection, yet.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work we have shown that the lack of proper integrity
protection can be exploited to execute arbitrary code within
SEV-ES secured VMs. We have reverse engineered the new,
XEX-based encryption on updated AMD Epyc processors,
and developed a method to control plaintext bytes by mov-
ing existing ciphertext blocks. After using this method for
bootstrapping a 2-byte encryption oracle, we have shown how
to place instructions to control 4 bytes and finally 16 bytes
per plaintext block, yielding a 16-byte encryption oracle. In
addition, we have shown how to abuse the emulated cpuid
instruction to build a high performance encryption oracle.
Compared to similar attacks, our attacks works with SEV-ES
and does not rely on any I/O operations.
We have discussed various countermeasures: A stronger
tweak function and disabling instruction interception might
significantly complicate our described attacks. However, we
do not expect that a full mitigation is possible without imple-
menting a proper integrity protection, which is able to detect
modified ciphertext before decryption.
Proof of concept code is available at https://github.com/
UzL-ITS/SEVurity/.
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